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Abstract—Fault analysis and bad data are often processed in
separate manners. In this paper it is proved that fault as well
as bad current measurement data can be modeled as control
failure for the power transmission network and any fault on the
transmission line can be treated as multiple bad data. Subse-
quently a linear observer theory is designed in order to identify
the fault type and bad data simultaneously. The state space model
based observer theory allows a particular failure mode manifest
itself as residual which remains in a fixed direction. Moreover
coordinate transformation is performed to allow the residual for
each failure mode to generate specific geometry characteristic
in separate output dimensions. The design approach based on
the observer theory is presented in this paper. The design allows
1) bad data detection for current measurement, and 2) fault
location, and fault resistance estimation (as a byproduct) where
the fault location accuracy is not affected by fault resistance.
However it loses freedom in designing the eigenvalues in the
excessive subspace. While the theoretical framework is general,
the analysis and design are dedicated to transmission lines.
Index Terms—Fault diagnosis, Luenberger observer, detection
subspace, excessive subspace.
I. INTRODUCTION
MODERN digital transmission line protective relays areoften equipped with individual functionalities including
1) fault detection, 2) single pole tripping, and 3) fault location
functions. The single pole tripping are based on use of the
phase selector to identify type of the fault, to eliminate
incorrect and insensitive fault identification that can be made
by distance protection element, and provide trip initiation from
elements that are not capable of any fault type identification,
such as high-set negative-sequence directional overcurrent
element.
The conventional relay fault identification method often
uses the variations in system voltages, currents, power and
frequency to detect fault occurrence, and uses phase relations
between sequence current components for fault identification
[1]–[5]. However the settings rely heavily on system level fault
study and need to change adaptively with various system con-
ditions. The conventional fault location methods with measure-
ments from both terminals of the line are mainly categorized
into phasor based method [6]. However the accuracy is often
limited with high impedance fault and location of the fault.
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Other theoretical approaches exist as well. The wavelet
transformation method is a time domain approach that detects
high frequency components contained in a fault signal spec-
trum [7]- [8]. The relays at both terminals of the line computes
the time difference between receipt of the high frequency
signals. However this method is limited by the data sampling
rate during transients at fault inception, which is often in
order of MHZ for an accurate estimation of fault location. The
artificial intelligence based method utilizes prior knowledge of
system quantities (such as voltage and current) under different
fault and operating conditions. This knowledge is used to train
a learning system to identify abnormal conditions and classify
them. Methods such as neural network [9], fuzzy theory [10],
decision tree [11], clustering [12] have been developed. The
major limitation is heavy computation time that may cause
operational delay and system instability.
The model based methods have also been widely investi-
gated. The approach is based on the generation of residual sig-
nals using observer theory that reflects the difference between
the actual and estimated values of the output as an indicator
of fault occurrence [13]–[18]. However this approach does
not allow fault identification and location, the main limitation
is that the residual being generated has no mathematical
meaning. In order to identify the fault type, a multiple model
filtering technique is proposed by [19], given the input and
output of the system, the goal is to determine which model,
in a set of predefined models, best approximates the actual
system behavior. The observer theory has also been adapted for
fault diagnosis in other engineering systems where the faults
are modeled as control failure [20], [21], the feedback in the
observer is designed specifically to allow a number of control
failures to generate uni-directional residuals. Inspired from
[20], this paper provides a comprehensive approach for the
fault diagnosis for transmission lines including fault detection,
identification and location. It first models the transmission line
under fault condition as control failure, then it provides two
different approaches for the fault diagnosis. While the same
theory has been applied similarly in converter systems [21],
such focus was on simple degradation in individual compo-
nents. This paper is dedicated to the transmission network
where the faults are much more complicated since it can
involve the ground and multiple phases. The originality of this
paper include: 1) it proves that the line faults can be treated
as control failure through mathematical arrangement, 2) it
proves that through specific filter design, the generated residual
can have mathematical meaning and the fault location can be
derived from the residuals, along with the fault resistance,
2Fig. 1. transmission line model – normal operation
compared to traditional methods where the fault location is
insensitive with high impedance fault.
This paper is organized as follow. In Section II the trans-
mission line models are described by state space model where
phase and ground faults are modeled as control failures. The
failure detection/observer theory is included in Section III.
The design based on observer theory and [20] is presented
in Section IV. The proposed research work is studied and
compared with state-of-art double terminal fault detection
method in V
This time domain approach is suited for protective relaying
applications where data samples are transmitted among the
relays at both terminals of the transmission line.
II. TRANSMISSION LINE MODELS
A. short transmission line
The transmission line pi-model was specifically developed
for fundamental frequency analysis. In this paper the same
transmission line model (single-section) is also used for
differential-algebraic equations (DAE) modeling as shown in
Fig. 3 and mathematically formulated below:
i1(t) = Cap
dv1(t)
dt
+ iL(t), (1a)
i2(t) = Cap
dv2(t)
dt
− iL(t), (1b)
0 = −v1(t) + v2(t) +RiL(t) + L
diL(t)
dt
, (1c)
where Cap, R, L ∈ R
4×4 are capacitance, resistance and
inductance matrices defined as Cap = [Cij ], R = [Rij ], L =
[Lij ].
i1(t), i2(t), v1(t), v2(t), iL(t) ∈ R
4 are state vectors, for
example, i1(t) =
[
ia1(t) ib1(t) ic1(t) in1(t)
]T
.
When a fault occurs, the transmission line model (1)
changes to
i1(t) = Cap
dv1(t)
dt
+ iL(t), (2a)
i2(t) = Cap
dv2(t)
dt
− iL(t), (2b)
0 = −v1(t) + vf (t) + αRiL1(t) + αL
diL1(t)
dt
, (2c)
0 = −vf (t) + v2(t) + (1− α)RiL2(t) + (1− α)L
diL2(t)
dt
,
(2d)
0 = −iL1(t) + iL2(t) +Gvf (t). (2e)
Fig. 2. transmission line mode – fault condition.
where α is the fault location with respect to the left terminal
0 < α < 1, vf (t) is the voltage vector at fault location, iL1(t)
is the inductor current vector to the left of the fault, and iL2(t)
is the inductor current vector to the right of the fault, as shown
in Fig. 2.
The fault matrix G is dependent on the specific fault type,
for example a phase A to ground fault derives the following
fault matrix:
G =
1
Rf


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 . (3)
The equations in (2) show that the transmission line fault has
to be modeled by augmenting the state space which includes
the inductor current on both sides of the fault, and the voltage
at the fault location. The fault model in (2) is loosely coupled
from the model in (1). In order to strongly couple the two
models, the following mathematical treatment is needed.
By summing (2c) and (2d) and defining a new state as
i′L(t) = αiL1(t) + (1− α)iL2(t), (4)
the KVL in fault condition is described by the following
equation:
0 = −v1(t) + v2(t) +Ri
′
L(t) + L
di′L(t)
dt
(5)
Note that during normal condition i′L(t) is the same as
iL(t). Thus (2) can be written in the same form as (1) after
mathematical rearrangement:
i1(t) = Cap
dv1(t)
dt
+ i′L(t) + (1− α)Gvf (t), (6a)
i2(t) = Cap
dv2(t)
dt
− i′L(t) + αGvf (t), (6b)
0 = −v1(t) + v2(t) +Ri
′
L(t) + L
di′L(t)
dt
. (6c)
The above model can be further translated into the state
space model:
dB1x(t)
dt
= −
(
A1B
−1
1
)
(B1x(t)) +

i1(t)i2(t)
0

− f(t), (7)
where f(t) =
[
(1− α)Gvf (t) αGvf (t) 0
]T
. And the
measurement vector y include three phase to neutral voltage
measurements on both terminals, and neutral to ground voltage
measurements on both terminals (pseudo measurements).
y(t) =
(
CB−11
)
(B1x(t)), (8)
3C =
[
K 04×4 04×4
04×4 K 04×4
]
(9)
K =


1 0 0 −1
0 1 0 −1
0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 1

 (10)
where x(t) =
[
vT1 (t), v
T
2 (t), i
T
L(t)
]T
. The vector u(t) =[
iT1 (t), i
T
2 (t), 0
T (t)
]T
acts as the control input for the system.
The fault residual f(t) can be derived separately for single
phase to ground faults, phase to phase faults, three phase fault,
phase current channel bad data (left or right terminal), phase
voltage channel bad data (left or right terminal). Examples for
single phase A to ground fault and current bad data on left
terminal are:
fA-G(t) =
[
(1 − α) 01×3 α 01×7
]T vaf (t)
Rf
, (11a)
fbad,ia1(t) =
[
1 01×11
]T
ia1(t), (11b)
where vaf (t) is the phase A to ground voltages at the fault
location, f is named the fault magnitude function. Here the
constant vector (as a function of α) is named fault event vector.
f(t) with subscript is named fault residual. By comparing 11a
and 11b, the fault event vector for single phase A to ground
fault is simply a linear combination of the fault event vectors
for phase A bad current measurements (left and right terminal).
The states are left multiplied by B1 for simple definition of
fault event vectors.
In general, the transmission line model in fault condition can
be summarized as an additional term as the model in normal
condition:
dx(t)
dt
= Ax(t) +Bu(t)− f(t), (12a)
y(t) = Cx(t). (12b)
B. long transmission line
The single-section model is well-suited for short transmis-
sion lines, e.g., 20 miles, while long transmission lines can be
modeled by concatenating multiple single-section pi-models.
III. FAILURE DETECTION THEORY
The principal concern of failure detection is to combine the
state estimation capability with a failure detection capability.
The Luenberger observer is to estimate the states by the
process model and the output feedback:
˙ˆx(t) = Axˆ(t) +Bu(t) +D(y(t)− Cxˆ(t)) (13)
When the reference model accurately represents the system,
the estimation error and output error can be determined in
terms of the error equations:
εˆ(t) = (A−DC)ε(t) (14a)
ε′(t) = Cε(t) (14b)
where ε(t) = x(t)− ˆx(t) is defined as the estimation error and
ε′(t) is defined as the output error. For the reference model to
be an asymptotically stable state estimator, it is necessary that
D be chosen such that all the eigenvalues of A − DC have
negative real parts.
In the event of a transmission line failure, the actual model
is equivalent as a controller failure as proposed in Section II:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + f1n1(t) (15)
f1 is the time-invariant fault event vector and n1(t) is the
time-varying fault magnitude function.
In the case of fault condition the estimation error can be
determined in terms of another error equation:
ε˙(t) = (A−DC)ε(t) + f1n1(t) (16)
The time functions ε(t) and ε′(t) satisfy:
ε(t) = e(A−DC)(t−t0)ε(t0)
+
∫ t
τ−t0
e(A−DC)(t−τ)f1n1(τ) dt (17a)
ε′(t) = Cε(t) (17b)
As can be observed from Section II, when the error term f1
is a constant vector and n1(t) is sinusoidal, the trajectory of
the estimation error must be contained in the subspace spanned
by f1:
W =
[
f1 (A−DC)f1 . . . (A−DC)
n−1f1
]
(18)
The output error ε′(t) is similarly constrained to the sub-
space spanned by CW .
As a result, it’s desirable to design the feedback matrix
D such that for each fault event vector, the output error
maintains a unique direction in the output space, meanwhile
maintain the desired eigenvalues of A − DC. The detailed
design in this paper relies on the concept of detection space,
annihilating polynomial, cyclic invariant, detection generator,
output separable, mutually detectable, excess subspace, output
stationary and canonical form. The definitions can be referred
in [20]. In order to discuss the designing approach in IV, some
of the theorems from [20] are briefly summarized below.
Theorem 1. Let
Df = Af
[
(Cf)T (Cf)
]−1
(Cf)T (19)
and
C′ =
[
Em − Cf
[
(Cf)T (Cf)
]−1
(Cf)T
]
C (20)
where Em is the identity matrix. Then the detection space is
Rf = η(M
′
d) (21)
where
M ′d =


C′
C′(A−DfC)
...
C′(A−DfC)
n−1

 . (22)
Theorem 1 provides a straightforward algorithm based on
orthogonality for finding detection spaces for the event vector.
It is possible that Rf is an invariant subspace with respect to
A−DC. It is also possible to show that this is cyclic-invariant
and there exists a unique vector g, defined as the detection
4generator, in Rf such that the vectors g,Ag, . . . , A
v−1g are
a basis for Rf .
Theorem 2. Let g be the detection generator for Rf . If ψd(·) is
the vf -order desired minimal polynomial for Rf with respect
to A−DC, then:
i) Akg ∈ Rf , k < vf − 1.
ii) CAvf−1g = Cf .
The statements i) and ii) imply that the vectors
g,Ag, . . . , Avf−1g are a basis for Rf . and D must satisfy:
DCAvf−1g = ψd(A)g. (23)
where ψd(A) is the minimal annihilating polynomial of g
with respect to A. Theorem 2 provides the numerical algorithm
for computing the feedback matrix D once all the detection
spaces are defined.
Theorem 3. The detection space RF for multiple failure F is
the subspace defined similarly as the detection space for single
failure subspace with
RF = η(M
′
D), (24a)
Df = AF
[
(CF )T (CF )
]−1
(CF )T , (24b)
C′F =
[
Em − CF
[
(CF )T (CF )
]−1
(CF )T
]
C, (24c)
M ′D =


C′F
C′F (A−DFC)
...
C′F (A−DFC)
n−1

 . (24d)
Theorem 4. If f1, . . . , fr are output separable, then the rela-
tionship between individual detection spaces and the detection
space RF is:
R1 ⊕R2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rr ⊂ RF . (25)
Theorem 5. The detection spaces R1, . . . , Rr are mutually
detectable if and only if
d(R1) + d(R2) + · · ·+ d(Rr) = d(RF ). (26)
Theorem 6. Let R0 be the excess subspace for RF such that
RF = R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rr ⊕R0 (27)
and
R0 ⊂ η(C). (28)
If D is chosen such that R1, . . . , Rr are invariant with respect
to A − DC, then the v0 = d(R0) eigenvalues of A − DC
associated with R0 are fixed and independent of the choice of
D.
Lemma 1. A canonical form for the state space model can be
achieved by coordinate transform from:
T−1 =
[
g1 . . . A
v1−1g1 . . . gr . . . A
vr−1gr T0
]
,
(29)
where:
T0 =
[
z1 . . . zv0
]
, (30)
z1, . . . , zv0 is a basis for the excess subspace R0.
And the transformation for the output space is:
T−1m =
[
CAv1−1g1 . . . CA
vr−1gr
]
. (31)
The transformation to base normal form is:
Aˆ = T−1AT, Bˆ = T−1BT, (32a)
Cˆ = T−1m CT, Dˆ = T
−1DTm, (32b)
By the transformation, the selection of the feedback matrix
D does not have to concern the direction of the generated
residual. However in this paper, the most significant advantage
is that the transformation allows Aˆ− DˆCˆ to be partially block
diagonal. In this design approach since all detection spaces are
non-intersecting and dimension 1, the generated residual for
each fault event vector to would lie in independent dimensions
as well.
IV. DESIGNING OPTIMAL DETECTION FILTER
A. bad data detection
This design approach assigns all fault event vectors for
direct detection of current measurement bad data:
F =
[
f1 f2 . . . f8
]
=

E4 00 E4
0 0

 . (33)
And the canonical transformation allows each fault event
vector fi only generates output residual in ei, which is the
ith basis. There are in total eight fault event vectors, the first
four event vectors, f1, f2, f3, and f4 are assigned to detect
the current measurement bad data through the left terminal,
the second four event vectors, f5, f6, f7, and f8 are assigned
to detect the current measurement bad data through the right
terminal.
According to Theorem 1, with C′ and Df computed, the
dimension of the observable subspaces M ′d for all the eight
event vectors f1, . . . , f8 are found to be 11, i.e.,
d(M ′d(fi)) = 11, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. (34)
So that the dimensions of the null spaces of the observable
subspaces are 1, i.e.,
vi = d
(
Ri
)
= d (η (M ′d (fi))) , i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. (35)
And since fi ⊂ R¯i, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, it follows that without
any further computation, the detection space for each fault
vector is known to be spanned by the fault event vector itself.
In matrix notation it means:
R¯i =
[
fi
]
, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. (36)
The computation of detection generators for f1, . . . , f8 is
also straightforward since from Theorem 2
CAvi−1gi = Cfi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. (37)
And since vi = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, it follows that the
detection generator of each detection space is the fault event
vector itself as well, i.e., gi = fi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8.
According to Theorem 3, the total detection space RF for
F is the null space of M ′D, and since the dimension of the
observable space:
d(M ′D(F )) = 0. (38)
5whereM ′D is empty space, it implies that the detection space
is full space:
RF = δ
12. (39)
Since d(F ) = d(CF ) = 8, it follows that the fault event
vectors are output separable. However from Theorem 5, since
8∑
i=1
d
(
Ri
)
= 8 < d
(
RF
)
= 12. (40)
So the fault event vectors are not mutually detectable. Based
on 6 the excess subspace R0 of dimension v0 = 4 is needed
such that:
RF = R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕R8 ⊕R0. (41)
And according to Theorem 6, four eigenvalues are indepen-
dent of the choice of D, i.e., the four eigenvalues are fixed.
Since the excess subspace belongs to the null space of C, i.e.,
R0 ⊂ η(C), and d(η(C)) = 4 as well as v0 = 4, the dimension
of the excess subspace is the same as the dimension of the null
space of C, so that
R0 = η(C). (42)
The general numerical computation of the excess subspace
can be referred in [20]. The procedure is to remove from
RF the subspaces R1, . . . , Rr in such a manner that only R0
remains.
Once the excess subspace and the unassignable eigenvalues
of A−DC have been determined, three options are available
to the design:
i) Choose a D for which each of f1, . . . , f8 generate uni-
directional output errors and accept the v0 unassignable
eigenvalues of A−DC.
ii) Find a subset of f1, . . . , f8 for which they are out-
put separable and mutual detectable, and there are no
unassignable eigenvalues.
iii) Increase the dimension of the reference model such that
all eigenvalues are assignable.
In the simulation part of this paper, it is revealed that the
unassignable eigenvalues are all negative. Thus option i) is
acceptable for transmission line application.
Since only eight eigenvalues can be assigned arbitrarily, let
the eigenvalues be λi for detection space Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8
respectively. The desired minimal annihilating polynomials
are:
ψd(A)gi = Ag − λigi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. (43)
With the desired minimal annihilating polynomials for each
detection space, the feedback matrix D can be computed by
Theorem 2
D =
[
ψd(A)g1 . . . ψd(A)g8
]
×
[
Cg1 . . . Cg8
]
−1
.
(44)
Finally the canonical form can be generated by the linear
transformation using T and Tm:
T−1 =
[
g1 g2 . . . g8 z1 z2 z3 z4
]
, (45a)
T−1m =
[
Cg1 Cg2 Cg3 Cg4 Cg5 Cg6 Cg7 Cg8
]
.
(45b)
where the excess subspace is spanned by the linearly indepen-
dent columns of zi.
R0 =
[
z1 . . . z4
]
. (46)
The canonical form allows the fault event vector fi to
generate the output residual only in ei, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, which
is the ith basis vector.
B. fault detection
From the design of the fault event vectors, it can be seen
that single phase to ground faults can be represented as linear
combinations of the fault event vectors.
Take the single phase to ground fault for example, since the
fault residual is:
fA-G(t) = ((1− α) f1 + αf5)
vaf (t)
Rf
. (47)
The actual estimation error in canonical form is computed
as:
εˆA-G(t) =
∫ t
τ=t0
e(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1fA-G(τ) dτ (48)
by assuming ε(t0) = 0 as all residuals grow exponentially
to 0 by the negative value of assigned eigenvalues. εˆ is the
estimation error after canonical transformation T .
And the output residual in canonical form is:
εˆ′A-G(t) = CˆεˆA-G(t) (49a)
= (1− α)
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1f1(τ)
vaf (τ)
Rf
dτ
+ α
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1f5(τ)
vaf (τ)
Rf
dτ
(49b)
= (1− α)
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ)
Rf
dτf1
+ α
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ)
Rf
dτf5 (49c)
= (1− α)SA-G(t)f1 + αSA-G(t)f5. (49d)
The derivation comes from the fact that f1 and f2 are only
constant vectors and they can be pulled outside the integral.
Before this operation the integral is performed on a vector,
and after this operation the integral is performed on a matrix.
Specifically, the matrix is:
SA-G(t) =
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ)
Rf
dτ. (50)
Since by the choice of the feedback matrix D and the
coordinate transformation, it is guaranteed that the integral
upon f1(t) lies only in the direction of e1 and the integral upon
f2(t) lies only in the direction of e2, the product of the time
varying matrix with the fault event vector can be represented
by the product of a scalar with the fault event vector:
SA-G(t)f1 = sA-G(t)e1, (51a)
SA-G(t)f5 = sA-G(t)e5. (51b)
6So that the combined output residual is:
εˆ′A-G(t) =
[
(1− α)sA-G(t) 01×3 αsA-G(t) 01×7
]T
.
(52)
For the same reason, a single phase B to ground fault would
generate a similar output residual as:
εˆ′B-G(t) =
[
0 (1− α)sB-G(t) 01×3 αsB-G(t) 01×6
]T
.
(53)
A single phase C to ground fault would generate a similar
output residual as:
εˆ′C-G(t) =
[
01×2 (1− α)sC-G(t) 01×3 αsC-G(t) 01×5
]T
.
(54)
To conclude, for any single phase to ground fault, the output
residuals are only non-zero in two directions: phase A-ground,
B-ground and C-ground faults generate output residual in
e1/e5, e2/e6, and e3/e7. This also proves that the single phase
to ground faults are output stationary to f1, . . . , f8. Also, the
fault location as represented in percentage can be computed
as ratio between the magnitudes of the two non-zero output
residuals. For example, in single phase A to ground fault, the
fault location can be computed by:
1− α
α
=
εˆ′A-G(t, 1)
εˆ′A-G(t, 5)
. (55)
where εˆ′A-G(t, i) is the ith row of transformed output residual
at time t. The fault location is with respect to the left terminal
of the transmission line.
On the other hand, the phase to phase fault behaves simi-
larly. Take an example for the phase A to phase B fault, the
fault residual is:
fA-B(t) = ((1− α)(f1 − f2) + α(f5 − f6))
vaf (t)− vbf (t)
Rf
.
(56)
The output residual in canonical form is:
εˆ′A-B(t) = CˆεˆA-B(t)
= (1− α)
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ) − vbf (τ)
Rf
dτf1
− (1− α)
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ)− vbf (τ)
Rf
dτf2
+ α
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ) − vbf (τ)
Rf
dτf5
− α
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
vaf (τ) − vbf (τ)
Rf
dτf6
= (1− α)SA-B(t)f1 − (1− α)SA-B(t)f2
+ αSA-B(t)f5 − αSA-B(t)f6. (57)
Or,
εˆ′A-B(t) =
[
(1− α)sA-B(t),−(1− α)sA-B(t), 0, 0,
αsA-B(t),−αsA-B(t), 01×6
]T
. (58)
Similarly,
εˆ′B-C(t) =
[
0, (1− α)sB-C(t),−(1− α)sB-C(t), 0, 0,
αsB-C(t),−αsB-C(t), 01×5
]T
. (59)
εˆ′C-A(t) =
[
− (1− α)sC-A(t), 0, (1− α)sC-A(t), 0,
− αsC-A(t), 0, αsC-A(t), 01×5
]T
. (60)
The fault location in percentage for phase A-B fault can
either be computed by ratio between the output residual in f1
and the output residual in f5, or between the output residual
in f2 and the output residual in f6.
Finally the three phase fault residual is:
fA-B-C(t) = ((1 − α)f1 + αf5)
2vaf (t)− vbf (t)− vcf (t)
Rf
= ((1− α)f2 + αf6)
2vbf (t)− vcf (t)− vaf (t)
Rf
= ((1− α)f3 + αf7)
2vcf(t)− vaf (t)− vbf (t)
Rf
(61)
The output residual is:
εˆ′A-B-C(t) =
[
(1− α)sA-B-C-1(t), (1 − α)sA-B-C-2(t),
(1 − α)sA-B-C-3(t), 0, αsA-B-C-1(t),
αsA-B-C-2(t), αsA-B-C-3(t), 01×5
]T
(62)
where
SA-B-C-1(t) =
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
2vaf (τ) − vbf (τ) − vcf (τ)
Rf
dτ, (63a)
SA-B-C-1(t)f1 = sA-B-C-1(t)f1, (63b)
SA-B-C-1(t)f5 = sA-B-C-1(t)f5, (63c)
SA-B-C-2(t) =
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
2vbf (τ) − vcf (τ)− vaf (τ)
Rf
dτ, (63d)
SA-B-C-2(t)f2 = sA-B-C-2(t)f2, (63e)
SA-B-C-2(t)f6 = sA-B-C-2(t)f6, (63f)
SA-B-C-3(t) =
∫ t
τ=t0
Cˆe(Aˆ−DˆCˆ)(t−τ)T−1
2vcf(τ) − vaf (τ) − vbf (τ)
Rf
dτ, (63g)
SA-B-C-3(t)f3 = sA-B-C-3(t)f3, (63h)
SA-B-C-3(t)f7 = sA-B-C-3(t)f7. (63i)
The conclusion from the discussion gives the following
theorem:
Theorem 7. With the fault event vector designed as in (33)
targeting at bad current measurement, the internal faults can be
detected by non-zero output residuals in corresponding phase,
and the fault location α(0 < α < 1) can be computed as the
ratio of the non-zero output residuals from the corresponding
faulted phase.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
The test case is a two bus system with the detection filter
monitoring a 128 km long line as illustrated in Fig. 1. The
parameters of the transmission line are summarized in Table
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TRANSMISSION LINE PARAMETERS
R (Ω) A B C N
A 12.270 7.180 7.197 6.748
B 7.180 12.310 7.216 6.750
C 7.197 7.216 12.350 6.757
N 6.748 6.750 6.757 147.3
L (H) A B C N
A 0.2881 0.1521 0.1342 0.1472
B 0.1521 0.2878 0.1519 0.1331
C 0.1342 0.1519 0.2878 0.1234
N 0.1472 0.1331 0.1234 0.4356
Cap (µF) A B C N
A 0.5624 -0.1447 -0.0728 -0.1086
B -0.1447 0.5807 -0.1479 -0.0565
C -0.0728 -0.1479 0.5525 -0.0387
N -0.1086 0.1331 -0.0387 0.4104
AC Iabc1 Iabc2
Trip TripVabcn1 Vabcn2
80 miles
Fig. 3. XXX Need to change this to WINIGS model.
I. The rated voltage is 115 kV and the rated current is 1300
A.
The simulated events are summarized in Table II. The
monitored transmission line is operating normally from time
t = 0.0s to 0.5s. Subsequently different single phase to ground
faults, phase to phase faults and three phase faults with various
fault resistance and fault location are simulated. The column
of fault location indicates the distance of the fault to the
left terminal of the line. The available measurements are all
phase current measurements on both sides of the terminals, and
three phase to neutral voltage measurements on both sides of
the terminals. The neutral to ground voltage measurement is
assumed as pseudo measurement with a constant value of 0.
All current measurements are treated in the state space model
as system control inputs, while all voltage measurements are
treated in the state space as system output.
The unassignable eigenvalues computed numerically are
0.8118, 0.9940, 0.9957, 0.9949 respectively. The assignable
eigenvalues are set at 0.1. The measurement noise for each
channel is within 0.02 p.u. Such level is used as threshold to
determine if non-zero residual is caused by noise or by fault.
The filtering results are presented from Figs 4 to 7. For
each graph there are six traces. The red/green/blue traces are
the residuals generated for phase A/B/C on the left terminal
of the line, the cyan/yellow/magenta traces are the residuals
generated for phase A/B/C on the right terminal of the line.
The residuals generated for the internal faults at 48 km
from left terminal of the line are illustrated in Fig. 4. For the
phase A to ground high impedance fault, only two residuals
TABLE II
SIMULATED EVENTS FOR TEST SYSTEM
Time Event Event Fault Fault Internal
(s) # Type Resistance (Ω) Location (km) or External
0.1–0.5 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.6–0.8 1 A-G 1000 48 Internal
1.0–1.2 2 B-G 500 48 Internal
1.4–1.6 3 B-C 0.5 48 Internal
1.8–2.0 4 C-G 500 64 Internal
2.2–2.4 5 A-C 10 64 Internal
2.6–2.8 6 A-B 20 64 Internal
3.0–3.2 7 A-B-C 1 128.032 External
3.4–3.6 8 A-B-C 2 16 Internal
3.8–4.0 9 A-G 1 16 Internal
Time Event Event
Bad Data
Bad Data
(s) # Type Type
4.2–4.4 10 A Left terminal Loss of current
4.6–4.8 11 B Left terminal Loss of current
5.0–5.2 12 C Left terminal Loss of current
5.4–5.6 13 A Right terminal Loss of current
5.8–6.0 14 B Right terminal Loss of current
6.2–6.4 15 C Right terminal Loss of current
have magnitude larger than 0.02 pu—the residual for phase A
left terminal is a sinusoidal wave with maximum magnitude
of 0.1393 pu, while the residual for phase A right terminal
has maximum magnitude of 0.0877 pu. The computed fault
location is 46.63 km. The 1.07% computation error is from
the modeling error. The fault location error would decrease
when a more severe fault generates larger residual.
For the phase B to ground high impedance fault, the
residual for phase B left terminal has maximum magnitude
of 0.2618 pu, the residual for phase B right terminal has
maximum magnitude of 0.152 pu. The computed fault location
is 47.018 km. The 0.7% computation error comes from the
modeling error.
When the fault is more severe the modeling error would con-
tribute less to the fault location inaccuracy, this is illustrated
for the phase B to C fault. Only four residuals have maximum
magnitude larger than 0.02 pu—the residual for phase B left
terminal has maximum magnitude of 7.322 pu, while the
residual for phase B right terminal has maximum magnitude
of 4.422 pu (and residuals for phase C). The computed fault
location is 48.15 km. This accounts for only 0.1% error.
The residuals generated for the internal faults at 64 km (50%
of the line) are illustrated in Fig. 5. Similarly for single phase
to ground fault, two residuals have magnitude exceeding the
threshold, and for phase to phase faults, four residuals have
magnitude exceeding the threshold. For the single phase C
to ground fault, the phase A to C fault, and the phase A to
B fault, the computed fault locations for all three cases are
0.13% error.
The residuals generated for three phase external faults, three
phase internal faults and single phase A to ground faults at
16 km from left terminal are illustrated in Fig. 6. For three
phase internal faults, phase A/B/C has residual of magnitude
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Fig. 4. Output Residuals for Faults at 48km, Corresponding to Event 1, 2
and 3
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Fig. 5. Output Residual for Faults at 64km.
16.77 p.u (left) and 2.421 p.u (right), which accounts for 16.15
km or 0.12% error.
On the other hand, when there is current measurement
bad data, only one residual corresponding to the bad data
channel would have magnitude larger than the threshold, this
is illustrated in Fig 7.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the general fault diagnosis problem
of power transmission network. The contribution of this paper
includes 1) it proves that the internal faults of transmission line
and bad data are equivalent and can be written in the same
control failure form, and it proposes to use the linear observer
theory to map each fault or bad data to a certain residual
channel, 2) it provides one design approach for transmission
line monitoring that allows detection of all types of internal
fault, bad data detection for current measurements, and fault
location.
Further work remains for this research, typically signature
CT saturation with bolted fault.
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